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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the burst of the Internet bubble, securities 
industry participants and observers have focused on "buy" 
" Visiting Professor of Law at  Pace University School of Law and Co- 
Director of its Securities Arbitration Clinic. The author would like to 
express her deep gratitude to Professor Barbara Black, Founder and Co- 
Director of the Clinic, for her editing suggestions, insightful comments, 
and all-around encouragement. 
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recommendations' made by purportedly independent 
research analysts2 to the investing public for technology and 
Internet stocks. Questions have been raised as to how all of 
those analysts could have been so wrong in their 
recommendations. Subsequently, their motivations and 
methods have been scr~tinized.~ Critics have focused on the 
apparent conflict of interest certain analysts faced: they 
recommended the purchase of securities to  the investing 
public and to customers of their own firms without disclosing 
the fact that they owned those very securities, that their 
compensation was tied to  their recommendations, or, even 
more significantly, that their firms received compensation -- 
typically in the form of investment banking business -- from 
the i ~ s u e r . ~  
In light of the media attention and public criticism 
lavished on brokerage firms' analysts and their undisclosed 
conflicts of interest, the industry has implemented many 
Analyst recommendations typically fall into three categories: buy, 
holdlneutral, or sell. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Analyzing 
Analyst Recommendations, [hereinafter Analyzing Analyst 
Recommendations], a t  http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/a~lysts.html ( ast 
modified June 20,2002). 
2 Securities research analysts "study publicly traded companies and 
make buy and sell recommendations on the securities of those companies. 
Most specialize in a particular industry or sector of the economy." Id. 
See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant & Simon Romero, When Wall Street 
Advice Turns Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2002, a t  C1 (reporting on firm's 
analyst's recommendation of securities of issuer, with which the f h n  had 
lucrative investment banking relationship); Gretchen Morgenson, 
Telecom's Pied Piper: Whose Side Was He On?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, 
$3 ,  at  1 (criticizing reputable telecommunications analyst who maintained 
buy recommendations on companies as  he reportedly helped his securities 
firm collect lucrative investment banking fees from the issuers); Scott 
Thurm, When Do Analysts Cover Their Own Interests?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
10, 2001, a t  C1 (reporting on one analyst who recommended purchases of 
companies without disclosing his ownership interests). 
Reflecting the level of public condemnation directed towards 
analysts as  the scapegoat for the investment excesses of the Internet 
bubble, even the daily comic strip "Dilbert" featured a series of strips 
mocking analysts for recommending stocks they owned. Dilbert Daily 
Comic Strips, Oct. 15, 16, 17, 2001. 
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changes. Many financial services firms have altered their 
company policy precluding or limiting the ownership by 
analysts of stocks they follow5 and securities self-regulatory 
organizations ("SROs") have enacted rules requiring 
heightened disclosure of any potential conflicts of interesk6 
Most significantly, regulators have begun enforcement 
investigations and proceedings? As one striking example of 
sweeping regulatory action, on April 8, 2002, New York 
State's Attorney General brought an enforcement action in 
state court under New York's state securities statute, the 
Martin Act: seeking a preliminary injunction directing 
Merrill Lynch and some of its research analysts to refrain 
from misleading disclosures in their research reports and 
seeking judicial intervention in the continuing inve~tigation.~ 
The &davit that the Attorney General filed in support of 
that application for relief was replete with egregious 
examples of conflicts faced by Merrill Lynch analysts -- 
For example, in August 2001, the Goldman Sachs Group took the 
first step of insisting that its research analysts disclose any ownership 
interests in companies they follow. See Analysts Told to Reveal Stakes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001, a t  C4. Just  six months later, the firm took the 
additional steps of banning all of its analysts from owning stocks in sectors 
they cover and separating its research department from the investment- 
banking division. See Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Sachs Moves to 
Tighten Stock Analysts' Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, a t  C15; 
see also Charles Gasparino & Jeff D. Opdyke, Merrill Alters a Policy on 
Analysts, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, a t  C1 (reporting on new policy 
adopted by Merrill Lynch & Co. barring its analysts from buying stock in 
companies they cover). 
"ee infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text. 
SEC Press Release, SEC Launches Inquiry Into Research Analyst 
Conflicts, available a t  http~/~~~m~.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56html (Apr. 
25, 2002); Patrick McGeehan, U.S. and State Regulators Join Inquiry on 
Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, a t  C10 (reporting that the 
Department of Justice and state securities regulators would begin 
investigating analysts). 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW $5 352 et seq. (2002). 
Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased by Undisclosed 
Conflicts of Interest, available a t  http://mv.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002 
/apr/a.pr08b-02.html (Apr. 8,2002). 
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including the allegation that the analysts themselves had 
different opinions of the issuers than those disseminated 
publicly in their supposedly independent research reports.1° 
The Supreme Court of New York granted the requested relief 
and, pending completion of the Attorney General's 
investigation, issued an order temporarily restraining the 
respondents from violating the Martin Act and specifically 
from preparing or disseminating any research report on an 
issuer without disclosing Merrill Lynch's investment 
banking relationships with that issuer." Not long after, 
Merrill Lynch settled with the Attorney General before it 
even filed formal charges -- agreeing to pay a $100 million 
penalty and to  restructure its research department to  
insulate analysts from many of these conflicts.12 
Outside of the regulatory landscape, investors 
increasingly have brought lawsuits and arbitrations against 
analysts for damages resulting from recommendations 
tainted by conflicts of interest.13 For example, in July 2001, 
lo Affidavit of Eric Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order 
Pursuant to General Business Law 3 354 [hereinafter Dinallo M.1, 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002~aprerrillL.pdf (Apr. 
8,2002). If true, the evidence described in the Dinallo ffidavit  provides a 
strong evidentiary basis to suggest the analysts recklessly or even 
intentionally defrauded investors. 
l1 Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, In the 
Matter of An Enquiry By Eliot Spitzer, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., Index No. 02- 
401522, available at http://~v.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b~O2. 
html (Apr. 8,2002). 
l2 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to 
Reform Investment Practices, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us 
/press/2002/may/may2la~02.html (May 21,2002). 
13 See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke & Susanne Craig, Hunt Family Members 
Win Case Against Goldman, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,2001, a t  B2. In the case 
reported in the article, a securities arbitration panel awarded about 
$400,000 to an investor against Goldman Sachs for losses in securities 
whose issuer was covered by a Goldman analyst who failed to disclose his 
conflicts of interest in the recommended security. However, because the 
award did not include an opinion (as arbitration awards typically do not), 
the reasoning of the arbitrators remains unknown. See In re Arbitration 
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Merrill Lynch settled an arbitration proceeding brought by a 
former customer before an arbitration panel of the New York 
Stock Exchange. Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $400,000 to 
the customer who alleged that he was misled by a favorable 
research report issued by Merrill Lynch technology-stock 
analyst, Henry Blodget (the analyst whose e-mails played a 
significant role in the New York State Attorney General's 
investigation), on a company whose securities the customer 
purchased. Both the customer's broker and Merri11 Lynch's 
report failed to disclose that Merrill Lynch had an 
investment banking relationship with the issuer.14 Due to 
the settlement, however, the legal theory underlying the 
claimant's case against Merrill Lynch and Blodget has not 
been tested. 
Securities research analysts provide securities 
recommendations for institutional and individual investors, 
and hold themselves out as providers of independent 
objective analyses of issuers. Analysts generally divide 
themselves into three types: "sell-side," "buy-side," or 
independent. Sell-side analysts are those analysts who work 
for large brokerage firms with brokerage customers.15 The 
brokers use the research to recommend and sell securities to 
their customers. These firms also typically have investment 
banking divisions that underwrite securities, and the 
investment banks use the analyst research to  serve an 
important due diligence function for the undenvriters.16 In 
contrast, buy-side analysts "typically work for institutional 
money managers -- such as mutual funds, hedge funds, or 
Between Stuart Hunt, et al. v. Goldman, Sachs and Co., Docket No. 00- 
00249,2001 WL 1008474 (N.A.S.D. Aug. 8,2001). 
l4 See Charles Gasparino, Merrill is Paying in Wake of Analyst's Call 
on Tech Stock, WALL ST. J., July 20,2001, a t  C1. 
l5 Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 1, a t  1. 
l6 Id. a t  2; see also Testimony of Robert R. Glauber, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 
Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on 
Analyst Independence [hereinafter Glauber Testimony], available at 
http://~mm.nasd.comlnewdsp/ppl~28.html (Feb. 27,2002). 
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investment advisers."17 Buy-side analysts work for firms 
that manage portfolios of others and make investment 
decisions directly on their behalf.ls Finally, independent 
analysts are not affiliated with either the sell-side or the 
buy-side and "sell their research reports on a subscription or 
other basis."lg 
Analysts' conflicts of interest are troubling to  investors, 
who rely on the integrity of these industry professionals. 
Under the shingle theory,20 broker-dealers, including their 
sell-side analyst employees, have a duty to deal fairly with 
their customers. This duty of fair dealing encompasses the 
duty to give customers their undivided loyalty.21 If an 
analyst serves two competing masters -- his firm's customers 
to  whom he recommends the purchase of a security, on the 
one hand, and the investment banking department of the 
firm, which stands to  lose lucrative investment banking fees 
from an issuer if the firm does not maintain a "buy" 
recommendation on the issuer's stock, on the other hand, 
then the analyst has violated this duty of loyalty.22 By 
failing to  disclose these divided loyalties in research reports, 
analysts have deceived the customers who rely on these 
reports to reflect an unbiased, objective analysis of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and market value of the securities. 
However, there appears to be scant precedent supporting 
an investor's right to  civil damages for undisclosed conflicts 
of interest by analysts. The federal securities laws, as 
currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, do not clearly 
17 Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 1, a t  2. 
l8 Id. a t  1. 
l9 Id. 
20 The shingle theory of liability of broker-dealers to their customers 
"presume[sl that a broker-dealer that hangs out a shingle and solicits 
customers makes an implied representation of fair dealing." Roberta S. 
Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1271 
(1995). 
21 NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §
2.03[A1[21 (3d ed. 2002). 
22 For a discussion of the variety of conflicts of interest that currently 
exist in the securities industry, see id. a t  9 1.02. 
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provide investors with a right of action against a broker- 
dealer or its employees merely for a breach of their 
professional duties.23 Indeed, numerous scholars have 
questioned the validity of the shingle theory as a basis for 
imposing federal securities fraud liability.24 Furthermore, 
enhanced industry regulation does not necessarily translate 
into additional private rights of action for the investing 
public. 
Historically, the courts have imposed liability on industry 
participants for failure to  disclose their intent to trade on the 
short-term market effect of their recommendations -- a 
practice known as "s~alping."~~ However, beyond scalping, 
what legal duties do analysts have to customers to disclose 
their conflicts of interest in the securities they recommend? 
Part I1 of this article addresses recent regulatory efforts 
to  proscribe undisclosed conflicts of interest beyond mere 
scalping, including ownership interests in recommended 
securities, and the compensation connection between 
analysts and investment bankers within a firm. Part I11 of 
this article traces the history of prior cases imposing liability 
on industry participants, including investment advisers, 
analysts and others, for failing to disclose their conflicts of 
interest when recommending securities. Part IV of this 
article then examines the question of whether analysts have 
any civil liability to  those relying on their recommendations 
for failure to disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest. 
Finally, the author concludes that, in light of the new 
regulations, analysts should be liable to  investors for their 
undisclosed conflicts of interest. 
" Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The 
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1006-07 
(2002). 
24 See Karmel, supra note 20, at 1272. 
25 See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text. 
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11. REGULATORY EFFORTS TO LIMIT 
UNDISCLOSED ANALYST CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST 
A. Existing Regulation 
Even before the recent criticism of analysts, regulations 
did mandate certain disclosures by industry participants -- 
including analysts -- involving potential conflicts of interest. 
First, section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("SA)26 
precludes any person, including any analyst, from receiving 
undisclosed compensation for making a securities 
reco~nmendation.~~ Second, the Investment Advisers Act 
("IAA")28 regulates those who provide investment advice, 
including buy-side analysts.29 However, the IAA does not 
provide a private right of action to  investors,3O and none of 
these regulations target sell-side analysts. 
26 15 U.S.C. 8 77q(b) (2000). 
27 This section explicitly prohibits publishing an investment 
newsletter or article containing a description of a security without 
disclosing any compensation received or to be received from the issuer. Id. 
However, most courts addressing this issue do not imply a private right of 
action under section 17(b). See, e.g., Ostler v. Codman Research Group, 
Inc., 1999 WL 1059684, a t  *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 20, 1999); Sowell v. Butcher & 
Singer, Inc., 1987 WL 10712, a t  *3 (E.D. Pa. May 13,1987). 
28 15 U.S.C. 5 8Ob-1 et seq. (2000). 
29 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-6 (2000). This section precludes advisers, including 
buy-side analysts, from "employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud any client or prospective client"; "engag[ing] in any transaction, 
practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any 
client"; "acting as principal for his own account" without disclosure; and 
"engag[ing] in any act, practice or course of business which is fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative." While the statute does not expressly require 
disclosure of buy-side analysts' conflicts of interests, the Supreme Court 
has construed this section to cover scalping. See infra notes 69-86 and 
accompanying text. 
30 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 
(1979). The IAA does permit investors to sue for the limited relief of 
rescission of an investment advisory agreement and return of advisory fees 
paid. See 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-15 (2000). 
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The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") 
closes this regulatory gap.31 Because most sell-side research 
analysts work for broker-dealers that must register with the 
NASD, they are deemed "associated persons"32 of their 
registered broker-dealer firms and thus are covered by 
NASD rules of conduct.33 Until recently, one NASD Conduct 
Rule mandated disclosure of only certain limited conflicts of 
interest by members in any advertisements and sales 
literature (including research  report^)?^ NASD Rule 2210, 
Communications with the Public, requires that members 
disclose in research reports that, among other things, the 
member firm makes a market in the recommended security, 
the member or its officers or partners own options, rights or 
warrants to purchase the recommended security, and the 
member managed or co-managed any public offering of the 
recommended security within the last three ~ea r s .3~  This 
regulation applies to  analysts' public recommendations 
broadly disseminated to  the public, where analysts are not in 
a fiduciary relationship with investors and the precise 
nature of their obligations to the public is less clear than in 
the individual context of the broker-customer relati~nship.~~ 
Significantly, this rule does not require that the member 
or analyst disclose any ownership interest in a recommended 
security. Thus, until very recently, there were no rules 
31 The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. is an SRO 
established pursuant to 15 U.S.C. $780-3(a), that creates rules to regulate 
the conduct of its members, which include almost all securities firms in 
the United States. The NASD is the world's largest securities SRO. 
NASD Regulation, Inc. enforces these rules. 
' The Securities Exchange Act defines "associated persons" and 
includes any employee of a broker-dealer. See 15 U.S.C. $78(c)(18) (2000). 
Associated persons must register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. $ 780 (2000). 
Article V of the By-Laws of the NASD similarly requires associated 
persons of NASD member firms to register with the NASD. By-Laws of 
the NASD, Art. V(l), NASD Manual (CCH) 2002. 
a See Glauber Testimony, supra note 16. 
NASD Conduct Rules, Rule 2210(d)(2), NASD Manual (CCH) 2002. 
Id. 
36 See THO~IAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 14.16[6] 
(2002). 
Heinonline - -  2002 Colum. Bus. L .  Rev. 639 2002 
640 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2002 
prohibiting buy-side or sell-side analysts from owning stock 
in the companies they cover, or rules controlling their 
relationship with the investment bankers in their own firms 
that may underwrite the companies they cover. It is 
precisely this loophole that garnered so much attention. 
B. Recent Regulatory Efforts 
On July 31, 2001, Laura Unger, the then acting 
Chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC"), testified before Congress regarding the conflicts of 
interest that research analysts face.37 She identified for the 
House Financial Services Subcommittee the sources of these 
llacutel' conflicts: 
First, an analyst's salary and bonus may be linked to 
the profitability of the firm's investment banking 
business, motivating analysts to attract and retain 
investment banking clients for the firm. Second, at 
some firms, analysts are accountable to  investment 
banking for their ratings. Third, analysts sometimes 
own a piece of the company they analyze, mostly 
through pre-IPO share  acquisition^.^^ 
37 Laura S. Unger, Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced 
by Brokerage Firms and Their Research Analysts, Before the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, United States House of 
Representatives [hereinafter Unger Testimony], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101oslu.htm (July 31, 2001). 
Commissioner Unger also simultaneously submitted similar written 
testimony to Congress. See Laura S. Unger, Written Testimony 
Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their 
 ekea arch Analysts, Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on 
Financial Services, United States House of Representatives [hereinafter 
Unger Written Testimony], available at http://mmv.sec.gov/news/ 
testimony/073101tslu.html. (July 31,2001). 
38 See Unger Testimony, supra note 37. Analysts' equity stakes in the 
positions they cover may also derive from direct stock purchases or 
participation in employee stock purchase pools. See Unger Written 
Testimony, supra note 37. 
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In making these observations of industry practices 
suggesting troubling conflicts of interest, Unger relied on 
evidence gathered by SEC staff that conducted on-site 
inspections of firms.39 These inspections revealed that 
research analysts routinely: (1) consulted with investment 
bankers at their firms regarding issuers the analysts 
covered, (2) covered companies that their firms underwrote, 
(3) provided investment bankers with advance notice of their 
changes in recommendations, and (4) issued "booster-shot 
research reports" right around the time a lock-up period 
expired (during which time the firm's associated persons 
may be restricted from selling).40 Unger also noted the more 
obvious problems of analysts owning stakes in companies 
they followed and the fact that positive research reports can 
"trigger higher trading volumes, resulting in higher 
commissions for the firms."41 The inspections also revealed 
that firm policies with respect to proscribing these practices 
varied greatly, that existing regulations did not prohibit 
many of these practices, and that compliance with the few 
existing regulations which do limit some of these practices 
was minimal, at least at some 
Commissioner Unger then highlighted several steps that 
the regulators and the industry had taken recently to 
improve the objectivity and independence of research 
analysts, including firm-wide review of internal policies and 
procedures and enhanced SRO reg~lat ion.~~ She also 
emphasized the importance of investor education, and the 
SEC's role in educating investors to the potential conflicts 
analysts face.44 She concluded by urging continued 
39 Unger Written Testimony, supra note 37. 
40 Unger Testimony, supra note 37. 
Unger Written Testimony, supra note 37. 
42 Id. 
43 Unger Testimony, supra note 37. 
44 Id. Commissioner Unger noted that the SEC's Office of Investor 
Education and Assistance published on its website an investor alert issued 
the previous month to explain to the public investor the role of the 
research analyst in order to help the investor identify potential conflicts of 
interest faced by analysts in issuing their recommendations, and to advise 
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examination of these conflicts and additional regulation to  
"minimize and manage" these conflicts.45 
In response to  the public's focus on analyst conflicts, the 
NASD proposed strengthening its rules to  regulate analyst 
disclosures. In July 2001, NASD Regulation ("NASDR") 
requested that the public comment on proposed amendments 
to  NASD Rule 2210.46 The amendments were designed to  
enhance disclosure requirements imposed by the NASD on 
research that analysts in their securities recommendations 
made either in written research reports or during public 
appearances (TV, radio, on-line chats, etc.). NASDR stated 
that the "proposal represents a first step to address issues 
related to  the quality and independence of research 
recommendations issued by firms and associated persons."47 
The proposed amended rule would have required analysts 
to  disclose: (1) any financial interest they have in a 
recommended security, (2) "if the member firm owns five 
percent or more of the total outstanding shares of any class 
of securities of the recommended issuer," and (3) that the 
"member has received compensation from the recommended 
issuer for any investment banking services provided to  the 
issuer within the last 12 months." The amended rule also 
would have required that any written disclosures be made 
"specifically and pr~minently."~~ 
In February 2002, the NASD superseded the July 2001 
proposal with a new, more comprehensive proposed rule 
change to  amend NASD rules to  address many of the 
practices identified by Commissioner Unger. Pursuant to  
investors how to protect themselves. Analyzing Analyst 
Recommendations, supra note 1, a t  1. 
45 Unger Testimony, supra note 37. 
46 See Required Disclosures for Securities Recommendations, NASD 
Notice to Members 01-45 -- Request for Comment (July 2001). 
41 Id. a t  1. 
48 Id. a t  3. The NASDR writes that "[tlhis language is intended to 
prohibit the use of boilerplate in footnotes and other inconspicuous 
locations in advertisements and sales literature, so that investors can 
more readily ascertain the existence and degree of any potential conflicts 
of interest." Id. 
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section 19(b)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
("SEA")49 and SEC Rule 19b-4,50 the NASD filed with the 
SEC a proposal to  establish NASD Rule 2711, "Research 
Analysts and Research Reports," to  address analyst conflicts 
of interesL51 Additionally, on February 27, 2002, the NYSE 
filed with the SEC a proposal similar to that of the NASD, 
seeking to  amend NYSE Rule 472, "Communications with 
the Public," to  regulate stock exchange members and its 
associated persons (including analysts), with respect to 
minimizing andlor disclosing analyst conflicts of intere~t.5~ 
On March 8, 2002, the SEC filed the NASD and NYSE 
proposals in the Federal Register, seeking public comment 
on the text of the amended Following a period of 
public comment, and the filing of additional minor 
amendments, on May 8, 2002, the SEC approved these 
proposed rule changes.54 As approved, NASD Rule 2711 
prohibits: 
49 15 U.S.C. 5$78sCb)(l) (2000). 
60 17 C.F.R. 5 240.1933-4 (2002). 
Form 19b-4, Proposed Rule Change to Establish Rule 2711, 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., available at 
http:ll~mm~.nasdr.com/pdf-text/fl2~2l-analyst.pdf(Feb. 8,2002). 
'* Form 19b-4, Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange, 
Inc., available at http://mm.nyse.com/pdf~/2002-09fi1.pdf (Feb. 26,2002). 
63 NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule 
Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of 
Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 45,526, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,526 (Mar. 14, 
2002). The SEC filing also reported that, on March 7, 2002, the NASD 
submitted an amendment to its proposed rule change which clarified the 
impact of proposed Rule 2711 on existing Rule 2210, and conformed 
certain required disclosures to the NYSE proposal. Id. a t  n. 3. 
SEC Press Release, Commission Approves Rules to Address Analyst 
Conflicts, S.E.C. Also Requires EDGAR Filings by Foreign Issuers, 
available at http:llm.sec.gov/newslpress/2002-63 (May 8, 2002); see 
also NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order 
Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Notice 
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 
to the Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. 1 to the Proposed Rule Change by the 
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the investment banking department of a firm from 
supervising or controlling analysts;55 
employees of the investment banking department 
from reviewing or approving a research report in 
advance of p~blicat ion;~~ 
members from submitting a research report to the 
issuer for its review before p~blicat ion;~~ 
members from tying analyst compensation to specific 
investment banking  transaction^;^' 
members from promising favorable research to an 
issuer in exchange for business or  compen~ation;~~ 
underwriters from issuing research reports on a 
company during a certain "quiet period" following an 
initial public or secondary ~ffering;~' 
analysts and their household members from buying 
or receiving an issuer's securities prior to an offering; 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of 
Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,908 (May 10,2002). 
55 As approved, NASD Rule 2711 and its commentary is available a t  
http~/www.nasdr.comIpdf-text/0239/ntm.t (Oct. 20,2002). 
56 NASD Rule 2711(b)(2)-(3). The rule makes an exception for 
investment banking review -- via the compliance or legal department -- for 
the purpose of verifying the factual accuracy of information or screening 
for any potential conflict of interest. 
57 NASD Rule 2711(c)(l)-(2). The rule makes an exception for review, 
under limited circumstances, by the issuer to verify the factual accuracy of 
company information. 
NASD Rule 2711(d). 
59 NASD Rule 2711(e). 
60 NASD Rule 2711(f)(l)-(2). The "quiet period" is forty days following 
an initial public offering and ten days following a secondary offering. This 
provision is intended to "reduce a manager's ability to improperly reward 
the subject company for its underwriting business by publishing favorable 
research after completion of the offering." Form 19b-4, supra note 51. 
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if the company is principally engaged in the same 
type of business covered by the analysG61 
analysts and their household members from trading 
securities in companies they cover either 30 days 
before or 5 days after the issuance of a research 
report;62 
analysts and their household members from trading 
against their current  recommendation^;^^ 
members from issuing research reports or an analyst 
from making public appearances without disclosing 
the analyst's financial interest in the recommended 
company or  the member's beneficial ownership of 1% 
or more of common stock of the company, or of any 
other known conflicts of interest of the member or 
the analyst;64 
members from issuing research reports or an analyst 
from making public appearances without disclosing 
additional information suggesting a conflict of 
interest, such as compensation received from the 
covered company, any officer or director position held 
by the analyst in the company, and whether the firm 
makes a market in the covered ~ecur i t ies ;~~ and 
members from issuing research reports without 
disclosing certain information about the analyst's 
rating, including the meaning of its ratings, the 
NASD Rule 2711(g)(l). 
a NASD Rule 2711(g)(2)(A)-(B). The rule does not cover such trading 
when an analyst seeks to sell all of his securities held in a company a t  the 
inception of coverage or following a significant news event concerning the 
subject company. 
" NASD Rule 2711(g)(3)-(4). The rule does permit such trading in 
limited circumstances, such as  personal financial needs of the beneficial 
owner of the research analyst account. 
NASD Rule 2711(h)(l)-(10). All disclosures required by subsection 
(h) must be "clear, comprehensive and prominent." 
a NASD Rule 2711(h)(2), (3)-(8). 
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distribution of its ratings, and valuation methods 
used to determine any price target.6" 
Finally, the rule requires each member to adopt and 
implement supervisory procedures designed to ensure 
compliance with proposed Rule 2711.67 
111. C M L  LIABILITY OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
PARTICIPANTS FOR UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST 
Now that these new rules are effective, the question 
arises as to whether any violation of them would give rise to 
civil liability for securities fraud under the federal securities 
laws to an investor who purchased a security based on the 
analyst's rec~mmendation.~~ An examination of the judicial 
development of liability for a more egregious undisclosed 
conflict of interest -- scalping -- can help answer this 
question. 
NASD Rule 2711(h)(4)-(9). The rule also provides a "catch-all" to 
cover any disclosures already required by any applicable rule or 
regulation. 
67 NASD Rule 2711(i). Simultaneous with the publication of these 
proposed rule changes, the NASD launched an investor education 
initiative designed "to educate investors about research reports, their 
value and their limitations." Press Release, NASD Launches Analyst 
Disclosure Investor Education Initiative, available a t  
http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2002/releaseO2Ol0.html (Feb. 12, 2002). 
As part of this initiative, the NASD published a "Guide to Understanding 
Securities Analyst Recommendations" and a "Glossary of Analyst 
Research Terms," both available a t  http://www.nasdr.com. 
68 Implicit in this question is the assumption that the new analyst 
rules do not provide for a private cause of action. While it is well- 
established that a violation of SRO rules does not give rise to a private 
right of action (see, e.g., In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th 
Cir. 1993); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 
1990)), a t  least one court has refused to vacate an arbitration award based 
on an SRO rule violation, concluding that the well-settled law precluding 
private lawsuits in courts for SRO rule violations does not preclude an 
award to a customer suing in arbitration for damages solely based on SRO 
rule violations. See Freeman v. Arahill, Index No. 111119/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County Oct. 18,2001). 
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A. Liability Under the Investment Advisers Act 
In 1963, the Supreme Court first addressed the practice 
of scalping -- defined as, at  least with respect to a registered 
investment adviser, the "practice of purchasing shares of a 
security for his own account shortly before recommending 
that security for long-term investment and then immediately 
selling the shares at a profit upon the rise in the market 
price following the recommendation."" In Capital Gains, the 
SEC brought an enforcement action against a registered 
investment advisor and his investment advisory firm, 
claiming that defendants' scalping activities violated section 
206(2) of the IAA70 At a preliminary injunction hearing in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, the SEC established that defendants, on six 
different occasions in an eight-month time period, purchased 
shares of a security "shortly" before a monthly report 
published by their investment advisory service recommended 
it for long-term in~estment .~~ On each occasion, the market 
price and trading volume of the recommended security rose 
within a few days after the service distributed the rep0rt.7~ 
Defendants "immediately thereafter" sold their shares of the 
securities at a profitY3 without disclosing "any aspect of these 
transactions to their clients or prospective clients."74 
69 SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 
(1963). 
15 U.S.C. $gob-6(2)(2000). This section prohibits any "transaction, 
practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any 
client or prospective client." 
375 U.S. at 182-83. In the Second Circuit's opinion affirming the 
denial of the injunction by the district court, the court of appeals reported 
that each of defendants' purchases were made three to seven days in 
advance of the recommendation. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 747-48 (2d Cir. 19611, afld on reh'g en bane, 306 F.2d 
606 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
7Z 375 U.S. at 183. 
73 Id. Defendants sold their stock within one or two weeks following 
the recommendation. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 300 F.2d a t  
747-48. 
74 375 U.S. a t  183. 
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In denying the injunction application, the district court 
narrowly construed the terms "fraud" and "deceit" in section 
206(2) and found that, absent proof that defendants intended 
to  defraud their clients or that defendants injured their 
clients, the SEC could not establish a violation of the IAA.75 
The SEC appealed. On appeal, the Second Circuit, sitting en 
banc, affirmed the denial of injunctive relief.76 The court of 
appeals ruled that a violation of the Act necessarily required 
a showing of intentional fraud, such as, inter alia, proof that 
defendants made the recommendations with the purpose of 
artificially inflating the value of the stock so that they could 
sell their shares at a profit.77 
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the SEC's 
application for an inj~nction.~~ First, after reviewing the 
legislative history and applying principles of statutory 
construction, the Court found that the SEC need not prove 
scienter to establish a violation of section 206(2).79 
Second, the Court held that the practice of scalping by a 
registered investment adviser violates the antifraud 
provision of the IAAS0 The Court focused on the 
nondisclosure to the clients by the f i d u c i e l  -- the 
investment adviser -- of his practice of "secretly trad[ing] on 
the market effect of his own recommendati~n."~~ Such an 
adviser, the Court found: 
may be motivated -- consciously or unconsciously -- to 
recommend a given security not because of its 
potential for long-run price increase (which would 
profit the client), but because of its potential for 
short-run price increase in response to anticipated 
75 Id. a t  184. 
76 Id. at 184-85. 
77 Id. a t  185. 
78 Id. a t  201. 
79 Id. a t  195. 
Id. a t  197. 
The Court acknowledged that, through section 206 of the IAA, 
Congress imposed a statutory fiduciary duty on investment advisers. Id. 
a t  191-92. 
82 Id. a t  196. 
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activity from the recommendation (which would 
profit the adviser). An investor seeking the advice of 
a registered investment adviser must, if the 
legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to 
evaluate such overlapping motivations, through 
appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an 
adviser is serving I'hvo masters1' or only one. .  . 
"especially. . . if one of the masters happens to be 
economic self-intere~t."'~ 
Thus, a trial court can reject the argument as irrelevant 
that the adviser believed in his recommendation and "did not 
offer it for the purpose of hrthering personal pecuniary 
 objective^."^^ Rather, the Court stated, "[ilt is the practice 
itself. . . with its potential for abuse, which 'operates as a 
fraud or deceit' within the meaning of the [IAAI when 
relevant information is s~ppressed."~~ The Court concluded 
that the SEC has the power to bring an action for injunctive 
relief requiring an investment adviser to disclose his 
personal interest in investments he recommends before 
trading on the market effect of those  recommendation^?^ 
Since Capital Gains, the SEC has brought several 
enforcement proceedings under the anti-fraud provisions of 
the IAA against investment advisers for failing to disclose 
scalping conduct and other conflicts of interest in their 
investment advice.87 For example, in Patrick Clements, the 
83 Id. (quoting United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 
U.S. 520, 549 (1961)). Thus, the trading is not fraudulent as long as it is 
disclosed; it is the nondisclosure of the fiduciary that constitutes the 
deceit. 
Id. at 200. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 201. While the SEC in Capital Gains sought only an 
injunction, Congress has since empowered the SEC, in the Securities 
Enforcement and Remedies Act of 1990, to seek monetary penalties 
against registered investment advisers for violations of the IAA. See 15 
U.S.C. 3 80b-9(e) (2000). 
" See, e.g., In re Kingsley, Jennison, McNulty & Morse, Inc., 50 S.E.C. 
Docket 310, 1991 WL 288369, at "11 (S.E.C. Nov. 14, 1991) (censuring 
investment adviser and its principal for failing to disclose to clients its 
"soft dollar" commission arrangement with brokerage iirm and stating 
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SEC found that an investment adviser, aided and abetted by 
its president, violated sections 206(1) and (2) of the IAA by 
failing to disclose in its investment letters -- which 
recommended a certain stock -- that the president personally 
purchased shares of that stock just prior to  the 
re~ommendation.~~ The president sold the shares for a loss 
after the recommendation, but the SEC did not find it 
relevant that the president lost money on the t ransact i~n.~~ 
In some cases, the defendants did not even trade in the 
securities following the recommendation; rather, the SEC 
focused merely on the investment adviser's failure to  disclose 
the potential conflict of interest in owning the recommended 
securities as the violative conduct.g0 
that "whenever trading by an investment advisor raises the possibility of a 
potential conflict with the interests of his advisory clients, the investment 
adviser has an affirmative obligation before engaging in such activities to 
obtain the informed consent of his clients on the basis of full and fair 
disclosure of all material facts" (quoting In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., et 
al., 43 S.E.C. 911, 916 (1968))); In re Frank S. Arko, 12 S.E.C. Docket 
1378, 1977 WL 176094 (S.E.C. Release No. 13801, July 25, 1977) 
(reporting institution of administrative proceedings against registered 
investment adviser under, inter alia, section 206 of the W for failing to 
disclose scalping scheme with respect to securities in three different 
companies); In re Patrick Clements, 42 S.E.C. 373, 1964 WL 66207 (S.E.C. 
Oct. 12, 1964). 
ss 1964 WL 66207. 
Id. a t  *5. The SEC concluded that "[elven though the shares were 
sold a t  a loss, the recommendation by [the investment adviser] of a stock 
in which [the president] was trading without revealing his personal 
interest in that stock constitutes fraudulent conduct." 
See In re Chancellor Capital Management, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2204, 
1994 WL 570098 (S.E.C. Oct. 18, 1994). In this case, the SEC found that 
an investment adviser and one of its portfolio managers violated section 
206 and other sections of the IAA by failing to disclose to clients that, on a t  
least two occasions, the portfolio manager recommended the purchase of 
shares in a company in which he personally owned shares. The portfolio 
manager had established business relationships with these companies and 
acquired the securities for nominal consideration as  much as eighteen 
months earlier, during the formation stages of the companies. Id. at  "3-4. 
The SEC noted that the firm had a general policy instructing employees to 
avoid conflicts of interest in making recommendations. Id. a t  "2. The 
SEC did not discuss whether the portfolio manager had sold his shares 
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While there seems to be little doubt that the IAA imposes 
strict liability for investment adviser scalping, claims under 
the IAA for scalping activities are limited in scope for several 
reasons. First, the IAA applies only to registered or 
unregistered investment advisers, as defined in the st a t ~ t e . ~ ~  
Thus, the SEC cannot rely on the IAA to bring disciplinary 
violations against other industry participants, such as sell- 
side research analysts. Second, it is well-settled that 
investors do not have a private right of action for 
compensatory damages under the strict liability provisions of 
the IAA.92 Therefore, the investing public needed to  invoke 
some other legal basis to sue industry participants for 
making recommendations without disclosing their scalping 
or other conflicts of intere~t.9~ 
following the investment recommendation, as it viewed the violating 
conduct to be the lack of disclosure of the conflict of interest, not any post- 
recommendation trading. Id. at  "'6-7. 
15 U.S.C. $gob-2(11) (2000). 
92 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 
(1979). 
93 SROS also have disciplined their registered broker-dealers and their 
associated persons for scalping conduct under SRO disciplinary rules. For 
example, in In re Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 31 S.E.C. Docket 
212, 1984 WL 53102 (Aug. 15, 1984), the SEC affirmed the American 
Stock Eschange's finding that a member brokerage firm had violated the 
Exchange's Constitution by engaging in conduct "inconsistent with just 
and equitable principles of trade," i.e., scalping. The Exchange found that 
Smith Barney effected certain transactions in options of a company in the 
firm's proprietary account before disseminating to the firm's public 
customers a research recommendation on that company. The SEC agreed 
with the Exchange that, "[iln order to avoid any potential conflict of 
interest, a firm should give its customers sufficient time to receive and 
digest a research recommendation that represents a material change in 
the firm's position before the firm trades the subject stock or related 
options for its own account." Id. at  '$2. The Exchange did not bring this 
disciplinary proceeding under anti-fraud provisions, and therefore, it 
focused on the trading rather than the failure to disclose as the unlawful 
conduct. 
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B. Liability Under the 1934 Act for Scalping 
As a result, after Capital Gains, both the SEC and private 
plaintiffs seeking relief from tainted recommendations 
looked to the most commonly-used statutory basis of liability 
for securities fraud: the antifraud provisions of the SEA.g" 
Today, a successful private plaintifP5 in a section lO(b)/Rule 
lob-5 lawsuit must prove the following elements: (1) a 
misrepresentation or omissiong6 of materialg7 fact, or other 
9.1 Section lo@) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b) (2000), and Rule lob-5 
promulgated by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. 3 240.10b-5 (2002), prohibit fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Section 10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange. . . (b) To use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement. . .any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as  the 
Commission may prescribe as  necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Rule lob-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud . . . or (c) To engage in any act, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person. 
The scope of liability under Rule lob-5 "is coextensive with the coverage of 
$ 10(b)." SEC v. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1901(2002). By contrast, the 
anti-fraud provision of the SA prohibits fraud in connection with the offer 
or purchase of securities. 15 U.S.C. 3 77q(a) (2000). 
95 SEC V. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that, 
contrary to a private plaintiff, the SEC need not prove the elements of 
justifiable reliance or damages). 
96 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that 
for liability premised on omissions, defendant must have a duty to 
disclose). 
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deceptive device, (2) in connection withg8 the purchase or sale 
of a ~ecurity,9~ (3) scienter by the defendant,loO (4) justifiable 
reliance by the plaintifFo1 and (5) causing damage to the 
plaintB.lo2 
Several courts have allowed a plaintiff to pursue a 
securities fiaud claim for failure to  disclose scalping and 
other conflicts of interest in connection with the 
recommendation of a security.lo3 For example, in Zweig, the 
owners of one of the companies involved in a corporate 
merger sued a newspaper financial columnist, alleging that 
he violated section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 by writing a 
favorable article about the other merging company without 
disclosing that he owned stock in that company, and that he 
" Information is deemed "material" if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable investor would have considered it important in making 
an investment decision. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
231-32 (1987); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 
(1976). 
99 The Supreme Court interprets the "in connection with" requirement 
broadly and has held that it is met as long as the scheme to defraud and 
the securities transaction "coincide." Zandford, 122 S. Ct. a t  1906. 
93 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 
(1975) (limiting those who have standing to sue under $ lo&) to 
purchasers or sellers of securities). 
loo See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 11.12 (1976) 
(holding that private cause of action for damages under $ 10(b) and Rule 
lob-5 will not lie absent scienter, defined in the opinion as "a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or dehaud"). 
lo' Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,153- 
54 (1970) (holding that "all that is necessary is that the facts withheld be 
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered 
them important in the making of the decision"). 
'02 For a general discussion of all of these elements, see POSER, supra 
note 21, a t  $3.01[D1[21-161, $ 4.01LAI. 
'03 See, e.g., Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 897 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 
1990) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendants on grounds 
that investors alleged valid $ 10(b) claims against their investment 
advisers for failure to disclose commissions received in recommended 
investments); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); Barthe 
v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("It is clear that 
[plaintiff investor] was entitled to know that lhis broker1 was in a position 
to gain financially from the deal" which the broker recommended.). 
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intended to sell some of the stock following the sharp rise in 
price that his article would cause.lo4 During a bench trial, 
the district court granted the columnist's motion to dismiss 
on the grounds that plaintiffs theory of liability for scalping 
under section 10(b) was not valid.lo5 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal 
of the action, holding that the columnist's conflict of interest 
was a material fact that his readers were entitled to know.lo6 
The court of appeals reasoned that "[rleasonable investors 
who read the column would have considered the motivations 
of a financial columnist such as [defendant] important in 
deciding whether to invest in the companies touted."lo7 The 
court also found that defendant "assumed" a duty to disclose 
the information withheld once he chose to "encourag[e] 
purchases of the securities in the market."los The court 
analogized the defendant to a corporate insider who 
withholds material information about the company's 
financial condition while trading in the stock, and found that 
the financial columnist has the same duty to his audience to 
avoid misleading them as to the reliance "they could place on 
his 
Finally, the court had little difficulty concluding that 
plaintiff could prove scienter through the defendant's 
knowledge of his ownership interests in the stock and his 
intent to benefit from the column.110 Thus, the court held 
that the federal securities laws: 
require a financial columnist, in recommending a 
security that he or she owns, to  provide the public 
with all material information he or she has on that 
security, including his or he r  ownership, and any  
intent  h e  or  she may have (a) to score a quick profit 
lo4 Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d a t  1262-63. 
'05 Id. a t  1263. 
'06 Id. a t  1264-66. 
lo' Id. a t  1266. 
'08 Id. a t  1268. 
log Id. a t  1266-67. 
"O Id. a t  1271. Similarly, the court presumed reliance from the 
nondisclosure, following the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute. Id. 
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on the recommendation, or (b) to allow or encourage 
the recommendation to be published as an 
advertisement in his or her own periodical.ll1 
Private investors are not the only ones who have looked 
to the broader antifraud provisions of the SEA. The SEC 
enforcement staff has parlayed its success in scalping cases 
against investment advisers to  bring enforcement 
proceedings against an expanded universe of defendants, 
including stock promoters and analysts, for failure to 
disclose conflicts of interest under section 10(b) of the SEA.l12 
The district court's decision in Blavin -- as one of the first 
courts to  apply section 10(b) to scalping in an SEC 
enforcement proceeding -- is instructive. In Blavin, the trial 
"' Id. In dicta, the Ninth Circuit discussed how to measure the 
damages: the difference between the actual market value of the merging 
company and the inflated value due to the rise in price following the 
defendant's misleading column. Id. a t  1269-70. 
" See, e.g., SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D.Il1.2000) (motion to 
dismiss denied on the grounds that securities information provider on the 
Internet is subject to IAA); SEC v. Carlisle, et al., Litigation Release No. 
15,949, 1998 WL 751084 (Oct. 27, 1998) (reporting filing of federal court 
complaint against defendants, who provided investor relations and stock 
promotion services, for scalping activities as violations of section 10(b) and 
Rule lob-5 of the SEA and section 17(a) of the SA); SEC Wins Summary 
Judgment Against Internet Microcap Stock Tout, SEC v. Huttoe, 
Litigation Release No. 15,906, 68 S.E.C. Docket 174 (S.E.C. Release No. 
15,906 Sept. 24, 1998) (reporting district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the SEC against newsletter writer and publisher employee 
for scalping); In re Ronald v. Speaker, 63 S.E.C. Docket 1640,1997 WL 987 
(S.E.C. Release No. 38161, Jan. 13, 1997) (reporting simultaneous 
institution and settlement of proceedings against investment adviser for 
failing to disclose conflict of interest in recommendation); In re Penny 
Stock Newsletter, Inc., 32 S.E.C. Docket 84,1984 WL 472325, at "4 (S.E.C. 
Dec. 19, 1984) (following Zweig and imposing sanctions on publisher of 
investment advisory newsletter under antifraud provisions of SEA and 
IAA, as well as section 17(b) of SA, for failing to disclose four separate pre- 
recommendation purchases and for falsely representing in newsletter that 
he would not purchase or sell recommended securities within 30 days of 
recommendation; the SEC concluded that "[slection 10(b) of the [SEA] 
requires an investment adviser to disclose potential conflicts of interest."); 
SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D.Mich. 19831, affd, 760 F.2d 706 
(6th Cir. 1985). 
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court granted summary judgment to  the SEC on its section 
10(b) claim under the SEA as well as its section 206(2) claim 
under the IAA.l13 Blavin was an unregistered investment 
adviser who authored, published and disseminated to 
subscribers and potential subscribers a newsletter that 
discussed and recommended certain securities.l14 Blavin did 
not dispute that, on numerous occasions, he owned or 
purchased large amounts of these securities just prior to 
publishing his "glowing"  recommendation^.^^^ It was also 
undisputed that Blavin failed to  disclose in the newsletter 
that he personally owned shares in the companies he was 
recommending.l16 The SEC also established that he sold his 
shares at a significant profit by trading on the market effect 
of his recommendations.l17 In fact, Blavin continued this 
practice after the SEC began investigating his activities and 
even after the SEC had obtained a preliminary injunction 
against him in this case.l18 
In holding that this conduct violated section 10(b), the 
district court found that Blavin's failure to disclose his 
conflicts of interest to  his subscribers was a material 
omission made with scienter in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities.llg First, because the "sole purpose" of 
the newsletters was to  recommend the purchase of stock, the 
court had no difficulty finding that Blavin's conduct met the 
"in connection with" requirement of section 10(b).lZ0 Second, 
the court concluded that Blavin's failure to disclose his 
ownership interests in and intent to sell the recommended 
securities constituted a material omission.121 
' I 3  557 F. Supp. a t  1310-15. 
""d. a t  1308. 
115 Id. a t  1311. 
116 Id. 
'I7 Id. a t  1308-09. 
Id. a t  1309. These additional violations in the face of a preliminary 
injunction resulted in a criminal contempt conviction against Blavin. Id. 
' I 9  Id. a t  1310. 
120 Id. a t  1310-11. 
12' Id. a t  1311 (relying on Zweig and stating that "[clourts have 
uniformly held that such schemes violate the securities Law [sic] and that 
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Finally, the district court found that Blavin acted with 
scienter because the "pattern of Blavin's activity creates an 
overwhelming presumption that this activity was 
intentional."122 Blavin testified at his deposition that he 
purposefully concealed from the SEC (once the investigation 
had begun) his large purchase of one particular stock 
"because he knew it would look wrong in view of the fact that 
he had recommended [the Finally, Blavin filed a 
form with the SEC contemporaneous with his violative 
conduct stating that he would not buy or sell a security 
recommended in his newsletter for 60 days before or after 
making such a re~ommendation.~~~ This constituted "clear 
evidence Blavin knew that his scalping activities were 
wrong."125 
However, neither the Sixth Circuit nor the district court 
in Blavin mentioned the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Chiarella v. United StateslZ6 and Dirks v. SEC,lZ7 both insider 
a failure to disclose such a 'scalping' scheme is a material omission 
prohibited by 8 10(b)"). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit specifically af£irmed 
this holding, and stated that "[tlhe effect of such large holdings on Blavin's 
objectivity in making investment recommendations would be particularly 
important to his clients." 760 F.2d a t  711. The district court also agreed 
with the SEC that certain company information in the newsletters 
contained material misstatements and omissions. 557 F. Supp. at 1311. 
557 F.Supp. a t  1312. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit questioned the 
district court's finding that the defendant acted intentionally, but held 
that the district court did not need to reach the issue of intent because the 
defendant's conduct certainly was reckless and thus satisfied the 
"recklessness" prong of scienter. 760 F.2d at 712 ("At a minimum, Blavin 
recklessly failed to disclose that he was trading in stocks that his 
newsletter recommended."). 
557 F. Supp. at 1312. 
lZ4 Id. 
Id. The court also found that the same conduct violated sections 
206(1), (2) and (4) of the IAA, where the SEC did not have to prove 
scienter. Id. at 1315. 
*%5 U.S. 222 (1980) (pre-dating Blavin). In Chiarella, the Court 
refused to impose insider trading liability on a printer who learned 
through his printing clients about their upcoming tender offers and then 
bought stock in the target companies. The Court found that the 
defendant's silence could not be the basis of fraud because he had no duty 
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trading cases, where the Court held that there can be no 
section 10(b) liability for omissions absent a duty to 
disc10se.l~~ Nor did the Blavin court address whether the 
defendant had a duty to  disclose. Thus, under current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the scope of section 10(b) and 
Rule lob-5 arguably is more limited than that recognized by 
the Ninth Circuit in Zweig, or even the Sixth Circuit in 
B1a~in . l~~ 
Alternatively, one can infer that the district court, while 
calling the defendant's failure to  disclose a "material 
omission," implicitly treated the omission as one that 
renders an affirmative statement (the recommendation in 
the newsletter) materially misleading, and therefore the 
SEC did not have to establish the existence of a duty to  
disclose. The Sixth Circuit's treatment of the issue was more 
direct: it considered the failure to disclose the extent of 
defendant's ownership in the recommended securities and 
to disclose arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence. The 
defendant's ability to utilize non-public information because of his position 
in the marketplace did not impose on him such a duty. 
127 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (post-dating district court's, but pre-dating 
Sixth Circuit's decision in Blavin). Dirks was an analyst and an officer of a 
brokerage firm who received a tip from a former officer of an insurance 
company that the company's assets were overvalued as a result of fraud. 
After investigating the allegations, Dirks informed his clients, 
institutional investors, about the fraud, and the clients sold their shares in 
the company. The SEC found him liable under $ 10(b) as an aider and 
abettor of the insider trading of his clients, but the Supreme Court 
reversed, concluding that Dirks was not liable because he had no duty to 
the company's shareholders. Moreover, the officer who had tipped him 
about the fraud had not breached his duty to the shareholders because his 
motive for disclosing -- to expose the fraud -- was laudable. 
Dirks, 63 U.S. a t  230; Chiarella, 445 U.S. a t  228. 
12' Since Zweig also pre-dates Chiarella and Dirks, the Ninth Circuit 
has questioned its holding in Zweig with respect to the duty to disclose. 
See Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982). 
However, other courts still consider Zweig to be good law. See SEC v. 
Park, 99 F.Supp.2d 889, 899 (N.D.Il1. 2000). For a more general 
discussion of how several significant Supreme Court opinions in the 1980s 
narrowed the scope of civil liability under the SEA, see Roberta S. Karmel, 
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information -- A Breach in Search of a 
Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 90-92 (1998). 
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the post-recommendation trading as material facts that 
rendered the disclaimer in the newsletters misleading.130 
Under this treatment, the Dirks and Chiarella decisions -- 
while narrowing the scope of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in 
the context of omissions -- have little impact on the result in 
Blavin. 
Recent legislation has further limited the scope of section 
10(b) and Rule lob-5. Plaintiffs filing their claims in federal 
court (as opposed to bringing an arbitration proceeding) 
must satisfy the strict pleading requirements of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").131 
Plaintiffs must allege with specificity "each statement 
alleged to  have been misleading" as well as "the reason or 
reasons why the statement is misleading."132 In addition, in 
order to  satisfy the element of scienter, the plaintiff must 
"state with particularity facts giving rise to  a strong 
inference that defendant acted with the required state of 
&d.11133 
Furthermore, because sell-side analysts are by definition 
employed by broker-dealers who are members of the NASD, 
many investor claims against analysts, particularly against 
those who work for the same firm with which the customer 
has the relevant trading account, would be brought as 
securities arbitration ~1aims.l~~ However, securities SRO 
130 SEC V. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706,711 (6th Cir. 1985). 
131 15 U.S.C. 5 78u-4 (2000). 
13' 15 U.S.C. $78~-4(b)(l) (2000). 
15 U.S.C. 5 78~-4(b)(2) (2000). 
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 10301 requires member firms 
and their associated persons to arbitrate, upon a customer's demand, 
"[alny dispute, claim or controversy. . . arising in connection with the 
business of such member or in connection with the activities of such 
associated persons . . . ." Moreover, most customers' agreements with 
their brokerage firms contain pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
("PDAA"), requiring arbitration of disputes arising out of the account. See 
Black & Gross, supra note 23, a t  991. Whether or not an investor's claim 
against an analyst employed by a firm other than the one where the 
investor was a customer can be arbitrated pursuant to Rule 10301 or the 
PDAA would be a litigable issue. 
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arbitration rules do not permit class action  arbitration^.'^^ 
Thus, class action plaintiffs must, under the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"),136 
bring almost any securities fraud claim in federal court 
rather than in state court. Because investor claims against 
sell-side analysts are likely to be brought as class actions, 
section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 will supply the primary basis of 
analysts' potential liability towards investors. 
Some of these class actions have not survived the 
pleading stage. For example, a series of class action lawsuits 
were brought against Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. 
("MSDW) and its employee, the well-known research 
analyst Mary Meeker. Plaintiffs -- open market purchasers 
of stocks covered by Meeker -- filed the complaints under the 
PSLRA in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. The complaints alleged that MSDW 
and Meeker violated, inter alia, section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 
of the SEA by recommending the purchase of several 
Internet stocks (AOL Time Warner, amazon.com, and Ebay) 
without disclosing Meeker's conflicts of interest based on 
financial arrangements with the issuer.13' The complaints 
alleged that Meeker used the positive recommendations to  
drum up investment banking business for her employer, 
MSDW, and that Meeker was compensated, in part, on the 
basis of the investment banking business she generated.13$ 
The complaints did not survive the pleading stage, however, 
as the court dismissed them without prejudice, sua ~ponte , '~~  
13' See, e.g., NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 10301(d). 
13' 15 U.S.C. 9 78bb(f) (2000). 
137 Tamara Loomis, Analyst Accountability: Suits Over Stock 
Recommendations Pose New Wrinkle, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16,2001, at 5. 
Id. 
13' See Senders v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. ¶ 91,536, 2001 WL 958927 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001); Stein v. Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91,537, 2001 WL 958936 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001); Lloyd v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,538, 2001 WL 959190 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001); 
Thomson v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 
91,539,2001 WL 958925 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,2001); Soto v. Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91,540, 2001 WL 958929 (S.D.N.Y. 
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on the grounds that they violated Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2) requiring "a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to  relief."140 
IV. UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS A 
PRIVATE VIOLATION OF RULE 10B-5 
The author is unaware of any case awarding damages to  
an investor who brought a claim for securities fraud under 
the SEA against an analyst or other industry participant 
lacking a fiduciary duty to the investor for recommending a 
secuity in a research report without disclosing conflicts of 
interest.141 However, when publicly disseminating a research 
report, an analyst's failure to  disclose his ownership of the 
recommended stock or any compensation arrangements 
related to his firm's investment banking activities for the 
issuer should lead to  section 10(b)/Rule lob-5 liability to  an 
investor who invests in reliance on that research report (the 
"misrepresentation"), as the conduct appears to satisfy each 
of the elements a private plaintiff must prove to  prevail. 
Moreover, imposing such liability squares with the 
"fundamental purpose" of the SEA to implement a 
"philosophy of full disclosure" to protect the integrity of the 
Aug. 21, 2001); Pludo v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. 91,541,2001 WL 958922 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,2001). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The court did not describe or even mention 
the substance of the securities fraud allegations, as it dismissed the 
complaints -- which were replete with quotes from and references to media 
coverage of Meeker -- due to "pleading improprieties" it considered "gross 
and unrestrained." See, e.g., Pludo, 2001 WL 958922, a t  "1. 
141 Rvo recent cases with unusual facts have survived a motion to 
dismiss. Cyber Media Group, Inc. v. Island Mortgage Network, Inc., 183 
F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussed inf-ra notes 152-56 and 
accompanying tex-t); In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Secs. Litig., 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶90,306,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 
1998) (denying motion to dismiss class action complaint against broker- 
dealer and an employee of its proprietary trading group who issued 
"Trading Notes" in the form of a n  analyst research report containing 
negative information about the issuers without disclosing that the h n  
had a short position in the covered securities). 
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securities markets.142 As the Supreme Court first announced 
in Capital Gains Research and has announced repeatedly 
since then, in enacting the SEA, Congress sought to  "achieve 
a high standard of business ethics in the securities 
A. Materiality 
First, courts routinely deem "material"144 the fact that an 
individual or entity recommending a security has a personal 
financial interest in the security andlor the issuer -- no 
matter how small the stake.145 An analyst might argue that 
an undisclosed small stake in the recommended security, in 
the context of a well-researched and analyzed report, is not 
14* Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) 
(quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,151 (19721, 
quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); 
see also 'United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (stating that 
the "animating purpose of the Exchange Act" is "to insure honest 
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence"). 
143 SEC V. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1900 (2002) (quoting Affiliated 
Ute Citizens of Utah, 406 U.S. a t  151). 
See supra note 97 for the definition of materiality. 
145 See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating 
that "[tlhe effect of such large holdings on Blavin's objectivity in making 
investment recommendations would be particularly important to his 
clients"); Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 
1970) (finding nondisclosure of market-making activity of broker in 
recommended security material); Addeo v. Braver, 956 F. Supp. 443, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that "though defendant's [undisclosed1 
commission was small, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the 
potential conflict of interest arising out of the commission would not have 
been material in the eyes of a reasonable investor"); Capital District 
Physician's Health Plan v. O'Higgins, 951 F. Supp. 352, 356 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997) (holding that a failure of investment adviser to disclose conflict of 
interest was material omission); SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1110 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313, 
318 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that "a person recommending a stock must 
disclose if he will gain financially from the sale above and beyond normal 
compensation"); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(holding that customer was entitled to know that his broker "was in a 
position to gain financially" from the recommendation). 
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material. Instead, some investors might be comforted to 
know that the analyst owned the stock, as a sign that the 
analyst had faith in the long-term performance of the issuer. 
However, every analyst report carries the implied 
representation that the analyst is disinterested, unbiased 
and objective, and this representation may be rendered 
materially misleading by the analyst's ownership of the 
stock. As courts have stated repeatedly, the investor is 
entitled to  know that the recommendation might have been 
motivated -- even subconsciously -- by the recommender's 
own financial interest rather than the investment value of 
the recommended security.146 
B. "In Connection With" 
Second, the Supreme Court construes the "in connection 
with" element quite broadly.14' Therefore, the mere fact that 
the analyst's misstatement or nondisclosure appeared in a 
securities research report or recommendation should suffice 
to meet the "in connection with" requirement.148 
'46 See, e.g., Addeo, 956 F. Supp. at  452; Credit Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16560, at '"19-20 (concluding that "a reasonable investor would 
have discounted the projections in the report if the investor had been 
aware of the [firm's] self-interest"); see also Capital Gains, 375 U.S. a t  196 
(holding that an investor must "be permitted to evaluate [even 
unconscious] overlapping motivations"). 
'47 See, e.g., Zandford, 122 S. Ct. a t  1900 (reversing Fourth Circuit's 
narrow interpretation of "in connection with" requirement and holding 
that element is met even if there is no "misrepresentation about the value 
of a particular security"); OIHagan, 521 U.S. at  655-56 (concluding that "in 
connection with" element met as long as securities transaction and 
nondisclosure in breach of duty coincide); Superintendent of Insurance v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (holding that "section 10(b) 
must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there was a 
'sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in connection with' it, there is 
redress under Q 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under a 
state law"). 
14' See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (finding that "in connection 
with" requirement permits section 10(b) to reach any device on which a 
reasonable investor would rely); see also SEC v. Gorsek, 2001 WL 
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C. Scienter 
Unlike under the IAA, the antifraud provisions of the 
SEA require proof of scienter -- an intent to deceive or 
recklessness.149 In all of the scalping cases, the defendants 
traded against their recommendations without disclosure of 
the trading. While the author has found no case expressly 
ruling that a sell-side analyst acted with scienter based 
merely on an undisclosed conflict of interest, rather than 
undisclosed trading, the cases suggest that the lack of any 
post-recommendation trading by an analyst who 
recommends the purchase of a stock without disclosing his 
personal financial interest in the stock does not preclude a 
finding of scienter -- even though the analyst does not profit 
off of the short-term effect of his market reco~nmendation.~~~ 
34001242, a t  "9 (C.D.Il1. Apr. 20,2001) (ruling that defendants' actions in 
attempting to influence investment decisions were done "in connection 
with" the sale of securities); SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp.2d 889, 900-01 
(N.D.Il1.2000) (finding that the omissions were made "in connection with" 
the purchase or sale of securities, as the allegations demonstrated that 
defendants expected their subscribers to act on their advice by purchasing 
securities); Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., 1998 WL 342050, a t  '*7 
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (holding the omission that, inter alia, brokers 
recommending funds had economic interest in the recommendation was 
"in connection with" the purchase of securities); Blavin, 557 F. Supp. a t  
1310-11. 
While the Supreme Court expressly left open the issue of whether 
reckless conduct can constitute scienter (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (197611, every circuit court that has addressed this 
issue has found that it does. See POSER, supra note 21, a t  5 3.01[D1[41. 
Recklessness for purposes of establishing scienter is defined as  "those 
highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not 
merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure 
from the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is 
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." Id. (quoting 
McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 
1989)). 
150 See Z~veig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(finding scienter based on defendant's knowledge of his ownership 
interests in the stock and his intent to benefit from the recommendation); 
SEC v. Gorsek, 2001 WL 34001242, a t  "8-9 (finding that the SEC proved 
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Other conduct or circumstances may suffice, such as 
evidence indicating the analysts did not believe their own 
recommendations or acknowledging the recommendations as 
necessary to  support their investment banking  colleague^.'^^ 
Very recently, a district court refused to dismiss a 
complaint alleging section 10(b) violations against an analyst 
for failing to disclose his conflict of interest, despite the lack 
of post-recommendation trading.152 In that case, plaintiff, an 
Internet advertising firm, alleged that defendants made 
material misrepresentations and omissions during 
negotiations to enter into a stock purchase agreement 
between defendant Apponline.com ("AOP) and Cyber Media 
Group ("CMG), pursuant to which AOP would buy the 
outstanding shares of CMG in exchange for shares of AOP.153 
Plaintiffs sued, among others, a hancial analyst and CNN 
commentator who once touted AOP as a "double-your-money" 
in~estrnent.'~~ Plaintiffs alleged that his statement 
promoting the stock could be an actionable material 
misstatement and that his failure to disclose that he stood to 
gain financially by an increase in the value of the stock he 
was touting could be an actionable material The 
scienter for defendants who failed to disclose their own potential for gain 
when issuing purportedly independent opinions on securities). But see 
Stanley S. Arkin, Analysts' Conflicts of Interest: Where's the Crime?, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 2002, at 3 (arguing that, absent conduct such as post- 
recommendation trading, it would be difficult to establish scienter). 
15' For example, the New York State Attorney General gathered a 
series of e-mails from Merrill Lynch analysts indicating that the analysts 
believed the companies they were recommending were not as financially 
sound as their recommendations indicated but did not disclose such lack of 
confidence, because the recommendations supported Merrill Lynch's 
undenvriting efforts on behalf of those same companies. See Dinallo Aff., 
supra note 10. 
l5*yber Media Group, Inc. v. Island Mortgage Network, Inc., 183 F. 
Supp.2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
Id. a t  566. 
'" Id. a t  567. The analyst, Courtney Smith, was CEO of a venture 
capital fund that owned AOP stock, and his compensation as CEO 
included stock in the fund, whose value rose as the value of AOP stock 
rose. Id. 
15' Id. at 574. 
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district court held that the omission could be material and 
that plaintiffs adequately pled scienter, just by virtue of the 
analyst's access to information about AOP and his 
undisclosed conflict of interest.156 
Furthermore, relying on prior decisions that infer scienter 
by a securities industry professional merely from the breach 
of a regulatory rule,15" a plaintiff can also claim that any 
breach of the new NASD and NYSE rules of conduct 
constitutes, at  a minimum, reckless conduct. Thus, based 
merely on the breach of NASD Rule 2711 or NYSE Amended 
Rule 472, a court could find that an analyst acted with the 
requisite scienter.15* While the Supreme Court has held that 
mere breach of a professional duty does not support a claim 
for securities fraud due to the lack of deception,159 that 
element is met here where the analyst disseminates a 
research report with the knowledge that disclosure is 
mandated by regulations and with the implied 
Id. The court ignored the element of "duty to disclose" entirely, 
presumably because it regarded the omission as  one, like the one in 
BLavin, that rendered an affirmative statement misleading. 
See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
135 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that broker's knowing 
violation of duty of best execution would allow a fact-finder to find that 
broker acted recklessly); Brown v. The E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 
1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "[slcienter may be inferred by 
finding that the defendant knew or reasonably believed that" his 
recommendation violated the suitability rule); Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, 
Jackson, & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
breach of broker's duty to make suitable recommendations is a "reckless 
violation of Section 10(b)"). But see Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 897 
F.2d 826, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to comply with 
disclosure regulations of the IAA "does not create per se liability under 
rule lob-5"). 
15' Cf. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (declining to find scienter because the alleged omission was not 
conclusively determined to be material by regulators or the courts a t  the 
time of the purchase). 
15' Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470, 474-76 (1977) 
(insisting on a finding of "deception," defined as the making of a material 
misrepresentation or the nondisclosure of material information in 
violation of a duty to disclose). 
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representation of objectivity and neutrality where that 
neutrality is seriously and knowingly compromised by his 
own economic interests. 
D. Duty to Disclose 
Because section 206 of the IAA establishes a statutory 
federal fiduciary duty for investment advisers,160 the SEC 
and the courts, even after Dirks, have not hesitated to find 
the requisite duty to disclose in cases against investment 
advisers -- registered or unregistered.161 However, where 
does the duty to disclose originate, absent the fiduciary 
relationship of the investment adviser? 
The SEC faced just such a dilemma recently in SEC v. 
Park.162 In that case, the SEC sued a website operator who 
recommended the purchase of securities to  website 
subscribers without disclosing that he intended to  trade on 
the market effects of his recommendations. The SEC 
charged that the defendants, including the individual 
defendant who called himself "Tokyo Joe" and operated the 
website tokyojoe.com, violated the antifraud provisions of the 
I M  and the SEA through his ~ca1ping.l~~ Defendants moved 
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Tokyo Joe was 
not an investment adviser within the meaning of the IAA, 
and that, with respect to  the section 10(b)/Rule lob-5 claim 
concerning omissions, the SEC failed to  allege that 
defendants had a duty to  disclose their scalping scheme and 
that the misstatements were not made "in connection with" 
the purchase or sale of securities.l'j4 
lEO See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,17 
(1979). 
See In re Penny Stock Newsletter, Inc., 32 S.E.C. Docket 84, 1984 
WL 472325, a t  :':4 (S.E.C. Dec. 19,1984) (stating that "Islection 10(b) of the 
[SEA] requires an investment adviser to disclose potential conflicts of 
interest"); SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304,1311 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (while 
not identifying a "duty to disclose" as an independent element of a 10(b) 
violation, recognizing the fiduciary duty imposed by the IAA). 
99 F. Supp.2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
I* Id. a t  892. 
lffl Id. 
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The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
denied the motion. First, the court held that the SEC 
alleged facts sufficient to support the conclusion that 
defendants were investment advisers within the meaning of 
the IAA.165 Second, the district court found that the 
defendants had a "duty to disclose" and that the material 
omissions were made "in connection with" the sale of 
securities. 
With respect to a duty to disclose, the court noted the 
Chiarella rule that "[flraud liability does not attach for 
failure to disclose material information unless a party is 
under the duty to disclose."166 However, the court rejected 
the SEC's argument that the duty to disclose under the SEA 
arose from the defendants' legal status as investment 
advisers.167 Rather, with little explanation, the court 
reasoned that the duty "must arise from a relationship 
outside securities law."16* 
The court then reasoned that defendants' alleged ongoing 
relationship with their subscribers -- which included daily 
electronic communications and the payment of a substantial 
fee for defendants' stock picks and advice -- provided the 
necessary relationship of trust and confidence. Analogizing 
the defendants to the newspaper columnist in Zweig,"j9 the 
Id. a t  893-896. The district court also rejected defendants' First 
Amendment claim. Id. a t  896-98. 
'" Id. a t  899 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 
(1980)). 
Id. Comparing the Supreme Court's holdings in Capital Gains and 
Dirks, the court found the Capital Gains' imposition of a duty on 
investment advisers applies to claims only brought under the IAA and 
that the Dirks' requirement of a duty outside the general duty to comply 
with the law is more applicable to claims under the SEA. Id. Thus, the 
district court implicitly dismissed prior authority which finds the requisite 
duty based merely on defendants' status as  investment advisers. 
16$ Id. 
Id. The district court expressly rejected the view that the holding 
in Chiarella overruled Zweig. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court in 
Chiarella "nowhere held that someone who encourages people to buy 
certain stocks and who also charges a fee to these people for this advice 
has no duty to disclose his interest in the stock). 
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court concluded that, like the columnist in Zweig who 
"assumed the duty to  disclose" by encouraging purchases in 
securities with an intent to  gain personally, the defendants 
in Park who "intend[ed] to engage in scalping" similarly 
"assume[d] a duty to disclose [their] interest in the targeted 
Research analysts who place "buy" recommendations on 
companies also assume a duty to disclose their personal or 
institutional financial self-interests. Just as market-makers 
must disclose the fact that they make a market -- and thus 
have a financial interest in trades -- sell-side analysts must 
disclose when they are not as disinterested as the industry 
holds them out to be. 
Another way around the duty to disclose is to frame the 
allegations in terms of an affirmative misrepresentation 
made misleading by the failure to disclose the conflict, rather 
than in terms of a material omission, in which case the 
plaintifY need not allege nor prove a duty to  disclose. This is 
precisely what the Blavin court did: it circumvented the need 
to  prove a duty to  disclose by characterizing the "omission" of 
the disclosure of the conflict of interest as one that rendered 
an existing statement materially misleading. 
In one criminal case, prosecutors followed precisely this 
strategy in a RICO and conspiracy prosecution involving a 
myriad of predicate acts, including securities fraud, allegedly 
committed by defendants and all designed to defraud the 
Id. at  900. Subsequent to the decision, Park settled the SEC's 
enforcement action by consenting to entry of an order permanently 
enjoining him from violating the securities laws and ordering that he 
disgorge $324,934 and pay $429,696 in civil penalties. SEC News Release, 
SEC Settles Securities Fraud Action Against "Tokyo Joe" Internet Stock 
Picker Required to Give Up All Illegal Profits, Pay a Penalty of More than 
$400,000 and Consent to the Entry of an Anti-fraud Injunction, 2001 WL 
226174 (S.E.C. Mar. 8, 2001). In the press release issued in conjunction 
with the settlement, then SEC Enforcement Director Richard Walker 
claimed that the case established "ground-breaking precedent," in that it 
imposed on those in the business of offering stock advice over the Internet 
the same duties as an investment adviser to disclose conflicts of interest. 
Id. 
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investing public.171 The indictment alleged, inter alia, that 
defendants, principals of a brokerage firm,172 disseminated 
materially false and misleading research reports 
recommending certain securities without disclosing (1) their 
financial interest in those securities, (2) the fact that they 
had bribed portfolio managers of mutual funds to  purchase 
the recommended securities to  create trading volume, (3) 
their expectation that the reports and the artificial volume 
would cause a rise in price of the recommended securities, 
and (4) their intent to trade and profit on the market effect of 
their bribery and fraudulent  recommendation^.^^^ 
Two of the defendants moved to dismiss the conspiracy 
and RICO counts on the grounds that they had not 
committed the underlying offense and predicate act of 
securities fraud because, as in Chiarella and Dirks, 
defendants had no duty to  disclose the alleged omissions.174 
The government argued that Chiarella and Dirks applied 
only to insider trading cases -- where a defendant trades on 
the basis of inside information, but remains silent to  the 
'I1 See United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 662 (D.N.J. 
1991). For a similar decision in a companion case against the analyst, see 
U.S. v. Cannistraro, 800 F. Supp. 30 (D.N.J. 1992). In Eisenberg, the 
government charged the defendants with RICO violations, conspiracy to 
commit racketeering, and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. 773 F. 
Supp. a t  672. The indictment alleged that the securities fraud served as 
predicate acts to the RICO violations. While Congress later amended the 
federal RICO statute to expressly preclude securities fraud as a predicate 
act (see Pub. L. No. 104-67, $$ 107, 109 Stat. 737,758 (19951, amending 18 
U.S.C. 5 1964(c) (199411, this amendment should not affect the analysis in 
this section. The indictment also charged one of the defendants with 
obstruction of justice, but those charges are not relevant to this discussion. 
773 F. Supp. a t  672. 
'I2 Defendant Eisenberg was an owner and president of the firm, 
defendant Cannistraro was a securities research analyst a t  the firm, and 
defendant Bertoli had a controlling and beneficial interest in several 
accounts a t  the firm. Id. a t  673. 
'I3 Id. a t  674-76. The indictment alleged that defendants purchased 
the recommended securities just before issuing materially false and 
misleading research reports, solely with the intent to sell those securities 
immediately following the dissemination of the reports. Id, 
'I4 Id. a t  717-18. 
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investing public with respect to the inside information, and 
not to  cases involving securities fraud based on scalping and 
bribery.175 
Agreeing with the government, Judge Lechner denied 
defendants' motion. The court stated that "[slection 10(b) 
makes illegal any 'manipulative or deceptive device,' which 
term has come to be defined as 'intentional or willful conduct 
designed to  deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially ~ e c t i n g  the price of se~urities.""~~ In light of this 
principle, Judge Lechner followed Blavin's holding that 
scalping allegations need not be analyzed in terms of a duty 
to disclose, as is the case for insider trading allegations, but 
in terms of a public statement rendered misleading by the 
omission of the material inf~rmation.'~~ Thus, the court held 
that, notwithstanding the presence or absence of defendants' 
duty to disclose, the government stated a viable securities 
fraud claim by alleging that defendants intentionally 
disseminated research reports because their nondisclosures 
rendered the reports false and mi~1eading.l~~ 
E. Reliance 
A securities fraud plaintiff must also prove that 
defendant's misrepresentation or omission caused him to 
purchase the recommended security, also known as the 
element of "transaction causation." An investor can satisfy 
this element by demonstrating that he relied on the analyst's 
report containing the misstatement when deciding to 
purchase the recommended security. Under this theory, 
'" Id. a t  718. 
'" Id. a t  721 (citations omitted). 
'" Id. a t  721-23. The court also cited to the Supreme Court's 
statement in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 209 n.56 (19851, holding that 
"public dissemination of publications timed to specific market activity, or 
to events affecting or having the ability to affect the securities industry, 
i.e., scalping," is "dangerous activity and covered by section 10(b)." 773 F. 
Supp. a t  723. 
''' Id. a t  723; accord In re Credit Suisse, First Boston Corp. Secs. 
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,306, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXS 16560, a t  
"'16-18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20,1998). 
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plaintiffs who reviewed the analyst's report can prove actual 
reliance on the misstatement or nondisclosure through 
evidence demonstrating that they would not have purchased 
the recommended securities if they had known of the conflict 
of interest faced by the ana1y~t.l'~ Additionally, a plaintiff 
may be entitled to a presumption of reliance in certain 
situations.180 First, in cases of material omissions rather 
than affirmative misstatements, an investor is entitled to  a 
presumption of reliance.lsl 
Second, in cases of affirmative misstatements, investor 
plaintiffs need not prove reliance if they invoke the fraud-on- 
the-market d0~trine. l~~ Under this doctrine, plaintiffs are 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of direct reliance if they 
relied on the integrity of an efficient market where face-to- 
face transactions do not 0 c ~ u r . l ~ ~  Notably, one factor that 
courts look to  in determining whether the security traded in 
an efficient market is the existence of a significant number of 
analyst reports covering the security.lS4 Therefore, unless 
the analyst in question is the only one who covered the 
pertinent security, the mere fact that there was analyst 
coverage of the security should help to  establish the fraud- 
on-the-market presumption. 
Moreover, courts have held that an investor's reliance on 
an investment advisor who, in turn, relied on the integrity of 
the market does not bar the investor from invoking the 
reliance-on-the-market d0~trine.l~~ Since virtually all 
179 Of course, a t  any trial, the investor would have to prove he or she 
received and reviewed the analyst's report, or that the broker who 
recommended the security relied on the report. 
lso See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154, 174 (3d Cir. 2001). 
la' See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 
154 (1972). 
la2 See Basic, 485 U.S. a t  247. 
Id.; see also Credit Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, a t  "23-24. 
See Freeman v. Laventhol & Honvath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 
1990); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264,1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989). 
See Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150, 1156-57 (C.D. 
Ill. 1991); Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 403-06 
(N.D. Ill. 1984). 
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securities covered by a research analyst are traded in an 
efficient market, a plaintiff could sue an analyst without the 
need to  prove reliance or transaction causation. 
F. Causation 
The PSLRA provides that, in any private securities fraud 
claim under Rule lob-5, "the plaintiff shall have the burden 
of proving that the [alleged fraudulent] act or omission of the 
defendant. . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to 
recover damages."186 This is known as the element of "loss 
causation" -- proving that the reason for the investment's 
decline in value stems from the defendant's misstatements.ls7 
If the investor can show that the price of the security had 
risen in response to the analyst's positive report containing a 
material misrepresentation, then the investor should be able 
to  satisfy the element of loss causation.1ss Moreover, analyst 
reports clearly contribute to  the market's valuation of the 
security, as most times an analyst issues a "buy" or 
otherwise positive recommendation on a security the market 
price for the security rises immediately thereafter.lsg The 
investor could argue that, had the investing public known 
that the analyst had an economic incentive to tout the stock, 
the stock price would not have been influenced by the 
analyst's report to  the extent that it was. The investor could 
lU6 15 U.S.C. 5 78u-4(b)(4) (2000). 
lS7 See Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489,1495 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(Misstatements must be "the cause of the transaction's turning out to be a 
losing one."); Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co, 1998 WL 342050, a t  
5-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (dismissing complaint by customers against 
their brokers for failure to disclose compensation for failure to plead, inter 
alia, loss causation). 
See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding 
complaint adequately pled loss causation where plaintiffs alleged that the 
market price dropped once the market became aware of the undisclosed 
material information, even if the initial nondisclosure did not inflate the 
stock's value). 
lS9 See, e.g., In re PeopleSoR, Inc., 2000 WL 1737936, at ''4 (N.D.Cal. 
May 25, 2000) (acknowledging that "[alnalysts have. . . clear and 
immediate influence on the stock market"). 
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prove this element through evidence showing that the price 
of the security dropped once the market became aware of the 
analyst's conflicts .Ig0 
G. Damages 
Finally, plaintiffs relying on an analyst's recommendation 
must prove they suffered damages as a result of the 
nondisclosure of the conflict of interest.lgl If the plaintiff can 
prove reliance and causation, and the plaintiff lost money as 
a result of engaging in the recommended transaction, 
presumably that plaintiff could satisfy the damages 
requirement.lg2 
V. CONCLUSION 
Investors who have lost money in securities transactions 
undertaken in reliance on recommendations by analysts who 
had undisclosed conflicts of interest inherent in their 
recommendations should be able to  sue their analysts for the 
resulting losses under the federal securities laws. There is 
no credible distinction between buy-side and sell-side 
analysts that justifies differing disclosure obligations. Both 
buy-side and sell-side analysts hold themselves out as 
providers of independent and disinterested research reports 
on issuers, and both types of analysts know that investors 
rely, in part, on these research reports when making their 
investment decisions. 
190 Id. 
lgl The PSLRA now limits damages in SEA lawsuits to "the difference 
between the purchase or sale price paid or received.. . and the mean 
trading price of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the 
date on which the information correcting the misstatement or omission 
that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market." 15 U.S.C. Q 
78u-4(e) (2000). This codifies the "out-of-pocket" measure as the 
applicable measure of damages in Rule lob-5 actions. 
lg2 Cf. Capital District Physician's Health Plan v. O'Higgins, 951 F. 
Supp. 352, 356-57 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting award to investor under Rule 
lob-5 for damages flowing from undisclosed conflict of interest by 
investment adviser). 
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As the Supreme Court noted long ago in Capital Gains 
Research, "affiliations by investment advisers with 
investment bankers or corporations might be 'an impediment 
to a disinterested, objective, or critical attitude toward an 
investment by clients."'lg3 Nearly forty years later, sell-side 
analyst research reports serve essentially the same function 
as buy-side analyst reports and similarly should be free of 
conflicts to live up to their firms' representation that the 
reports are disinterested. Any violation of that 
representation should give rise to civil liability under section 
10(b) of the SEA, regardless of whether the analyst trades on 
the market effect of the report because the violation stems 
not from post-recommendation trading, but from the lack of 
complete disclosure of the conflict of interest. Such liability 
is consistent with the primary legislative intent of the SEA 
to protect the investor. 
Moreover, newly enacted NASD Rule 2711 and amended 
NYSE Rule 472, which impose heightened disclosure 
obligations on analysts, strengthen an investor's securities 
fraud claim in several material respects by providing a clear 
industry standard by which violations are measured. First, 
the rules firmly establish the materiality of the conflict of 
interest. Second, the rules impose a duty to  disclose on all 
analysts. Third, the rules ease the burden for a plaintiff to  
prove scienter because analysts would be hard-pressed to 
argue that they did not know or appreciate the importance of 
complete disclosure of any economic self-interest in their 
research. Thus, courts or arbitrators would see the failure to 
disclose any conflicts of interest as, at a minimum, reckless, 
if not intentionally deceptive. 
This deceptive aspect to  the research report is what 
pushes the nondisclosure from the merely unfair into the 
realm of securities fraud. The Supreme Court plainly holds 
that section 10(b) of the SEA "provides a cause of action for 
lg3 SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187-88 
(1963) (quoting Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Pursuant to Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 
on Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Advisory 
Services, H.R. Doc. No. 477,76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1). 
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any plaintiff who 'suffer[s] an injury as a result of deceptive 
practices touching its sale [or purchase] of sec~rities.""~~ 
And the Court itself classified as "deceptive" the failure to  
disclose conflicts of interest in Capital Gains Research.lg5 
While the securities industry has come a long way in 
eliminating deceptive conduct, and the Supreme Court and 
Congress have limited the scope of the antifraud provisions 
of the SEA, investors are still entitled to honest research 
reports free from undisclosed and unfair conflicts of interest. 
lg4 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (quoting 
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co, 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 
(1971)). 
lg5 Id. a t  475 n.15. 
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